Rerouting Safety on Indian Railways! Time for more than more of the same

Railway safety is making headlines for all the wrong reasons lately, with two dominant narratives emerging based on where you stand politically. On one side, critics claim that the instances of rail accidents have gone up massively in recent times and that Indian Railways (IR) has been focusing on flashy projects like the Vande Bharat trains and swanky stations for sheer optics, neglecting the more pressing issue of passenger safety. On the other side, some allege that cases of averted accidents, and even accidents, have gone up due to nefarious elements working to derail trains by placing obstructions on tracks and that a sinister plot by external enemies is at play, with sleeper cells and saboteurs actively working to cause accidents.

 

Frankly, both of these perspectives miss the mark by a wide margin.

 

The recent spate of railway accidents has naturally stirred up public, media, and political scrutiny. However, the conversation often revolves around raw statistics. While it is tempting to believe that accidents are on the rise, and that is what is being shouted by the opposition, IR has been consistently presenting data showing the opposite—that accidents and fatalities have actually declined. Given the happenings today, however, it was expected that the opposition would seize the moment to criticize, alleging that IR was more invested in PR than in passenger safety. The rail ministry has been quick to counter, pointing out that safety measures have, in fact, seen significant improvements, particularly since 2014.

 

It is true—the number of accidents and fatalities has been trending down. And no, it is not solely due to the current government’s actions, but rather decades of work by successive governments: focused work in eliminating unmanned level crossings, ramping up track maintenance and renewal, improving signalling systems, and phasing out outdated coaches in favour of safer LHB models. Yet, it is also undeniable that capital expenditure for these improvements has surged since 2014, with budgetary support and borrowing increasing five to six times.

 

But let us be clear: this does not mean that IR has nailed rail safety. Comparing today’s accident data with decades past is pointless. We now have technology and tools capable of attaining a near-zero accident regime. The discourse should be laser-focused on that. The goal is not simply "doing better than before"—it is doing that good which is within the realm of possibility now, with all the modern tools at hand. That should be the target, and nothing less. In any case, as stated earlier, the current scenario of substantial investment by the central government, allocating nearly 25% of its total Capex to railways, makes funding all safety works well within IR’s reach and non-availability of resources cannot be a red herring any more.

 

The second narrative, that of sabotage? This narrative has been built earlier also but is now a routine starting from the Balasore accident to recent ones like the accidents of Chandigarh-Dibrugarh Express near Gonda and Sabarmati express near Kanpur. In addition, many cases of averted accidents in the face of an obstruction placed on the tracks are being highlighted. The ministry issued a list of twenty four such cases since June 23, to which some more have been added recently, with placement of obstructions like wooden piece or log, milestone or fouling mark stone, PSC sleeper, stones, steel rods, steel pipes, small gas cylinders, motor cycle wheels and chassis, bicycles, scissors, and mobiles, in some cases by Youtubers. It inexplicably includes cases of stone pelting, attacks by unruly elements, vandalization, tampering of signal lights, run over cases of RPF personnel, murder of an off-duty station master, theft of Pandrol clips etc. None of these case appear grave enough to cause a derailment, except perhaps two, one of Kalindi express hitting an LPG cylinder with petrol cans placed nearby and another of concrete milestones placed on the DFC track near Ajmer. The list itself appears to have been put together hurriedly to press a point but it fails miserably in convincing any railway man who knows that many such cases are not so unusual to merit national attention.

 

We have to tread responsibly here. I am no one to say that sabotage is ruled out. In the serious cases I mentioned, and others, investigating agencies are on the job apart from RPF’s own investigation. NIA has stepped in. We should wait for their report before jumping to any conclusion as it can only spread panic without any reason. We have to keep in mind the news that Farhatullah Ghori, the Pakistan-based terror mastermind behind various terrorist attacks in India, has sent a message to terror sleeper cells in India, urging them to carry out attacks on trains, petroleum pipelines etc. Nevertheless, it does appear a bit far-fetched because the type of obstructions placed on the tracks do not show a professional terror job. It is also possible that there is an intention to create panic and disruption without the need to derail a train; if so, to that extent, their nefarious designs seem to be succeeding. Nevertheless, should the agencies report that there indeed was a conspiracy to derail trains, it would be a grave matter. At the same even the limited intention to create panic is also serious enough. IR can enhance patrolling and advise its staff, specially crew, to be more cautious but the menace can be tackled only by neutralizing such vile outfits through smart intelligence and counter-terror measures. At the same time, it is disappointing that the sabotage angle is being investigated for some months but we have not heard of any concrete findings of involvement of disruptive forces.

 

When it comes to other incidents, juvenile criminality and mischief don’t amount to a grand conspiracy. The perpetrators should be dealt with by the book and face the full force of the law. Blowing such incidents out of proportion as sabotage only serves to stir up panic and divert attention from genuine safety improvements. These matters need to be handled quietly but with the iron fist they deserve. Two recent cases paint the picture: one, where some track maintenance staff in Gujarat planted fishplates themselves in a harebrained scheme to claim a safety award, and another where a disgruntled railway staff placed detonators on the track, leading to a military special train in MP bursting them. In both cases, social and national media—armed with half-baked knowledge about joggled fishplates and warning detonators—ran wild with conspiracy theories. But when the truth came out, they still refused to eat humble pie, despite having egg all over their faces.

 

Reverting to the grassroot safety issues, I cannot fault you if you experienced a million instances of déjà vu. As the dust and din has just about begin to settle in respect of recent fatal accidents, thanks to other compelling news, I am compelled to recall spirit of chachā (uncle) Ghālib:

 

Yā-rab vo na samjhe haiñ na samjheñge mirī baat

de aur dil un ko jo na de mujh ko zabāñ aur

(O Lord! They never comprehended my supplications nor ever will they my pleas so give them more heart or else the greater gift of speech to me.)

 

Let me bring out some critical points seriatim:

 

A statutory inquiry by the Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) into the Kanchenjunga accident is currently underway. The preliminary report casts a wide net of blame—not just on the crew of the container train, the station master, and signal maintainers for disregard of Automatic Signal territory protocol during failure, but quite sharply, also on the management for lapses. These include the failure to enforce critical precautions at restricted speed, and a lack of clear guidelines for the station and control staff resulting in issuance of an ambiguous memo to the crew,. In response, Indian Railways has finally woken up, mandating a clear protocol for such emergencies in Automatic Signal territory. Very late indeed but better late than never, as the ministry appears to be working on harmonizing subsidiary rules (SR) across all railway zones.

 

However, other critical issues in this case demand closer scrutiny. First and foremost is IR's handling of information and communication. Even as the facts were still trickling in, the then CEO of IR hastily declared that the said accident was caused by the container train crew’s disregard for signals—an assertion that has since proven only partially accurate. To make matters worse, she prematurely announced that both crew members had died, an insensitive and erroneous statement, as the Assistant Loco Pilot had, in fact, survived. This rush to conclusions not only undermined the inquiry but also reflected poorly on the sensitivity of the response.

 

When questioned about the slow rollout of Kavach, an indigenous signalling system that also prevents collisions, IR tends to cite limited capacity in the supporting industry as a main reason. If industrial capacity is lacking, it is IR’s responsibility to encourage and nurture the allied industry with meaningful assurances so they invest in capacity building. Notably, IR decided to adopt the Kavach system after extensive trials over 1,400 km on the SC Railway nearly three years ago, preferring it over the established European system, ETCS Level II. The project has been a work in progress since then, without the addition of a single new section. Such slow execution of a project, which the minister himself declared as the future, indicates a lack of focus on safety works by IR. If IR is still not confident of the system’s efficacy or speed of implementation, why plan for its adoption across the board? And If indeed that is the case, there is no harm in installing ETCS Level II in some important sections while Kavach matures. It is notable that the RRTS system of NCR has provided for an advanced version of ETCS level II system. Is it not ironic that a project under the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs leads the way in implementing a safe signalling system while IR procrastinates?

 

We have been hearing that Kavach is under implementation on the Delhi-Howrah and Delhi-Mumbai sections, but the target for completion has been missed. It is pertinent to refer to two recommendations from the CRS’ report on the Vizianagaram accident last year, which left 17 people dead; the report emphasized the priority implementation of Kavach in Automatic Signalling territories, as they are prone to collisions, and suggested faster installation in ahead of ground installations to increase the probability, if not guarantee, of preventing collisions even as the comprehensive installation of Kavach remains a work in progress. While IR has since issued a large tender for making locomotives and trains Kavach-enabled, it is more important to fixate on the trunk routes and Automatic territories for faster installation of Kavach, aiming for 4,000 to 5,000 km/year, which is achievable. 

Instead of a clear road map we hear news of trials of Kavach 4.0, the next version. In the same breath that with the design and testing phases over, including through trials and pilots, the government was aiming to cover the entire network of over one lakh kilometres and more than 7,000 stations with Kavach during the next few years and that tenders had been issued for fitting 10,000 locomotives and 9,600 kilometres of track length with Kavach. No commitment for completion on Delhi-Howrah and Delhi-Mumbai sections, let alone any realistic annual target of Kavach coverage, except a vague declaration of nation-wide roll out by 2030 which, perhaps deliberately ill-defined, is neither here nor there. More disturbingly, the author has learned that even in the Hyderabad area, Kavach is often disabled. Although the safety certification of Kavach is of the highest order, its reliability needs to be proven through actual utilization. If a mishap occurs somewhere in these 1,400 kilometers, IR would be hard-pressed to explain.

A pressing question is whether the accidents in Automatic Signalling territory are mere aberrations or if similar near-misses are all too common in the affected sections or even all other such sections. CRS inquiries suggest the latter, revealing that such incidents are frequent, with managerial indifference often playing a significant role. This raises the glaring issue of modernizing safety protocols—specifically, the baffling inaction in adopting AI-enabled tools for post-mortem analysis and actionable alerts. Given the complexity and delays of manual analysis, the case for employing AI is crystal clear. IR is sitting on a goldmine of digital data—from station data loggers to locomotive/train microprocessors—but this treasure trove remains buried in departmental silos, never properly collated. AI could seamlessly manage this data, filtering out irregularities and highlighting critical issues for the highest levels of railway management on a day-to-day basis. The failure to embrace this technology is not just a missed opportunity, but a serious safety oversight.

 

We now-a-days do hear of IR dabbling with AI-based applications—like installing CCTV cameras in trains at astronomical costs, enhancing passenger amenities and reservation, and even deploying stink-sensors for toilets. Yet, tragically, not a whisper on how AI might be used to harness the treasure trove of digital data for improving safety. Instead, we recently got the same tired, bureaucratic refrain from the very top in the ministry: monitor the data at the DRM’s level daily, and the Board will do sample checks in 2-3 divisions. A classic inspectorial response from a clueless babudom trying to swat a technological fly with a bureaucratic newspaper. It’s like fighting a fire with a teaspoon of water—well-intentioned, but hopelessly outdated!

Civil infrastructure and maintenance of track and has to be high priority and there is some good news in that respect. The ministry has announced that there is a greater thrust on ultrasonic tests for the entire network, new ultrasound machines have been introduced, a large number of railway bridges rehabilitated, and hundreds of flyovers and underpasses constructed recently.

IR, like many government entities, is overstaffed, and I am not going to defend that. However, there are some safety-critical categories where work is intensely continuous, such as Loco Crew, Train Manager, Station Master, Pointsman and Signal Maintainer. Any vacancies in these categories mean stress and overwork for the existing staff. Carrying such vacancies to save some expenditure is self-defeating. Although there are nearly 20,000 vacancies for Loco Pilot/Assistant Loco Pilot positions, IR issued a notice for recruiting only 5,658 heads earlier this year. When the issue was raised strongly after this accident, this was revised to 18,799 heads, clearly showing a cavalier handling of an important matter.

IR’s safety record, both in absolute terms and in fatalities per year, has undeniably improved over the years. However, in today’s world, hiding behind this data is no longer acceptable. Despite investments in safety—though often insufficient—there is now no excuse for anything less than a relentless pursuit of near-zero accidents. With modern technology at hand, the goal must be nothing short of a zero-fatality benchmark. The clock is ticking—it is time for IR to snap out of its complacency and take decisive action.

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