LHBfication, indeed! Good but can it be done in a jiffy?

 



LHB coaches are inherently much safer than their ICF type counterparts. This fact is established beyond debate, mainly due to the anti-climbing feature and the Tight-lock coupler provided in the former. However, they come with their own set of quirks that Indian Railways (IR) has been grappling with for two decades. For example, jerks at the time of acceleration and braking and wheel shelling. Think of it like trading a vintage car's charm for a sleek, modern ride that is just as likely to give you whiplash when you are sound asleep.

 

In the cacophony following the Kanchenjunga train mishap, one of the loudest questions has been about the absence of LHB coaches in the express train's rake. Normally, I would not touch this topic with a ten-foot pole because of a classic déjà vu; it has been written, and correctly so, more times than a Bollywood star's secret wedding. But then I stumbled upon this gem from India Today, which is either poorly researched or a masterclass in how not to write an article:

 

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/kanchanjunga-express-train-accident-bengal-train-collision-icf-coaches-lhb-coaches-2556595-2024-06-22

 

To give IR credit where it is due, IR has a plan in place to phase out ICF type coaches and replace them with LHB coaches. But let us be real: this was not a Harry Potter movie where you could just wave a magic wand and shout "LHBfication!" and poof, 45000 ICF type coaches would vanish. The replacement pace has been pretty good, but according to this article, ‘LHBfication’, a curious term as it sounds like a transformation of the coach itself, is something you can achieve with a sprinkle of pixie dust and an abracadabra.

 

Allow me to dissect this trainwreck of an article for our dear readers, point by point, with my comments in blue:

 

The article kicks off with, ‘Kanchenjunga train mishap: Why it's time to ramp up switch to LHB coaches’, and quotes the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) who have been repeatedly warning the government about the dangers of using Integral Coach Factory (ICF) rakes, urging them to replace all ICF coaches with Linke-Hofmann-Busch (LHB) coaches to enhance passenger safety.

 

Fair enough

 

It goes on to state that this accident has once again raised concerns about the railway safety system. It mentions that the crash reportedly occurred at a speed of around 80 km per hour, causing three coaches of the Kanchenjunga Express to derail and two coaches to become mangled beyond recognition. The crash allegedly happened because the automatic signalling system in the area was not functional, leading to manual signalling procedures being followed.

 

Fine, but are we kidding here or what? The accident did not happen simply because manual signalling procedures were in place. This is not an uncommon practice. The root cause, prima facie, seems to be the disregard of established procedures and protocols by the Loco Pilot and the Station Master. Not to nitpick, but one would expect words and the sense in an article from a reputed publication like India Today to be chosen with a bit more care.

 

The article states that the Kanchenjunga Express comprised age-old and outdated ICF type coaches, which have repeatedly proven to be significant safety hazards. It mentions that the production of these ICF coaches was permanently halted in 2014.

 

Yes, ICF type coaches are indeed less safe due to the damage they suffer in collisions or high-speed derailments, leading to higher casualties. Calling them a menace might be a bit harsh, considering they were the backbone of IR passenger services from the 1950s until recently. Also, for the record, the production of ICF coaches was stopped in 2017, not 2014. (Do I detect a fixation on 2014 here? 😀)

 

The article also points out that in November 2020, the CAG, in its audit report, stated that ICF coaches have resulted in 98 percent more deaths compared to LHB coaches. According to the CAG report, out of 20 train accidents (including derailments and collisions) between 2014 and 2018, 17 involved ICF coaches and three involved LHB coaches. In accidents with ICF coaches, 371 people died and 1,142 were injured, while in accidents involving LHB coaches, six people died and 115 sustained injuries.

 

I did not verify these numbers, but they seem to be accurate.

 

In 2017, then Union Railway Minister Piyush Goyal promised that all ICF type rakes would be replaced by safer LHB rakes by 2022. However, in September 2020, the CAG once again raised concerns about the continued use of ICF rakes, stating that with the current rate of production, it would take another eight years to replace all 903 ICF type rakes with LHB rolling stock. With the current rate of LHB coach production (7,000 coaches manufactured in FY 2023-24), the complete transition to LHB coaches seems like a distant dream.

 

I do not recall these specific declarations by the former Minister of Railways. Perhaps he was referring only to mail/express trains, considering the number of ICF coaches far exceeds the 903 rakes (or approximately 20,000 coaches) mentioned here. Moreover, not all newly produced LHB coaches can be used solely for replacements; new services also require LHB coaches. We all know that politicians can be overly ambitious, and reporters from reputable publications should do their own research and provide well-founded opinions, which at times is a matter of simply collating facts, figures and sound logic.

 

The article then cites a Ministry of Railways report from January 2024, stating that 50.5 percent of Indian Railways' passenger rolling stock is now LHB, while 49.5 percent remains ICF. It notes that approximately 35,450 ICF coaches still need to be replaced and that a source in the IR claims that by the end of the current financial year, the transition from all ICF rakes to LHB rolling stock will be completed.


What a contradiction; by this time the article has already said that the capacity of new manufacture of LHB coaches is 7000 per year, the population of ICF type coaches is 35450 and yet it quotes a cryptic ‘source in the IR’ that by 31st march 25, all ICF type coaches would be converted to LHB type. Can you not do a simple math, my dear reporter?

 

The article heaps praise on the LHB coach, highlighting their significant advantages over ICF type coach. These advantages include anti-climbing features to prevent coaches from mounting each other during a collision, crashworthiness to absorb and dissipate energy during a collision to minimize impact forces on passengers, fire-retardant materials, an emergency braking system, improved suspension, energy-absorbing couplers, and advanced signalling and communication systems to maintain safe distances between trains and improve communication between the train crew and control centers.

 

There are some features which are directly related to safety and listing them is fine. But since fire-retardant materials is mentioned, did they check whether recent fire accidents involved LHB cases? As a matter of fact, they did. It has a microprocessor-based brake system but to call it Emergency Braking system and linking suspension system directly to safety instead of ride quality hints at a copy paste job from an unreliable source. And the coup de grâce is the bit about advanced signalling and communication systems, which are typically features of locomotives and train sets, not individual LHB coaches; since when did LHB coaches come with all these bells and whistles?


There are many unnecessary repetitions and excessive details about certain accidents and train compositions that I have chosen to ignore. However, the article does mention the Balasore accident, asserting that the tragedy would have been much worse if the two express trains had ICF coaches.

 

I am not so sure about this. The collision was so severe that even LHB coaches toppled, got mangled and slid along the tracks. While we would like to believe that LHB coaches would significantly mitigate such disasters, it is technically challenging to make that claim with certainty.

 

Now my tuppence. The article could have made its point in half the space without repetitions, misquotes, and mistakes. Nevertheless, I do believe that the replacement of ICF type coaches with LHB or train sets needs to be further prioritized. According to the production plans for 2024-25 and 2025-26, the total number of LHB coaches planned for production is 5,688 and 4,840, respectively. This is puzzlingly low when IR’s factories can easily produce 7,000, and with some push, 8,000 coaches per year. One reason for the low production targets seems to be the overly ambitious plan to manufacture 1,012 and 1,600 train sets in 2024-25 and 2025-26. Given that the current production achievement is merely around 500 coaches per year, this goal appears to be grossly unrealistic.

 

I suggest that the production of LHB coaches should be targeted at around 7,500 per year. With this level of production, ICF type coaches could be phased out from all mainline trains within in approximately five years. This decision must be made with the full understanding that a significant number of ICF coaches will need to be retired prematurely. Considering the pros and cons, including safety concerns, this approach is acceptable and clearly superior to the previous decision of indiscriminate electrification, which rendered thousands of operational diesel locomotives redundant. Additionally, there should be an opportunity to increase the number of LHB AC coaches, which have been suddenly, inexplicably and drastically reduced to accommodate more non-AC coaches following criticism for the reduction of non-AC coaches in trains. Three years back, the same IR had the then minister declaring that IR would henceforth manufacture only AC coaches. IR should recognize that these new coaches will be in service for a minimum of thirty years, and adding non-AC coaches in such large numbers contradicts the vision of a developed India by 2047.

 

There is enough capacity in IR’s factories, and now in the private sector too, to manufacture train sets and AC LHB coaches in high numbers, without compromising the needs of common travelers.

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Comments

  1. Good & Great Information sir

    ReplyDelete
  2. The Jurno must have contacted some junior person in IR and got information on technical issues. Most of us will rely upon the article as we are not aware unless pointed out by an expert like you.

    ReplyDelete
  3. Unfortunately, knowledgeable investigative reporters, especially on issues related to the railways, do not exist in India. All the info is based on hearsay material or the one that PRO has handed over to them during Chai-Samosa session.

    ReplyDelete
  4. Good information but what the Government thinks about this issue?

    ReplyDelete
  5. Rahul Agrawal, ED GMAJune 24, 2024 at 5:14 PM

    Commendable response from person like you who knows ins & out of ICF and coaches.

    ReplyDelete
  6. Instead of investigating what led to the accident (and the earlier ones) in the first place, namely, disregard of standard operating procedures by staff, the article diverts the attention to a less significant problem, namely LHB coaches. These coaches may provide greater safety in case of collisions but the kind of collisions this accident as well as the Balasore accident involved would almost certainly have led to large number of casualties any way. Kavach coould provide some greater safety, surely, but there are limits to these technological solutions. Still the skills and the willingness to go by SoPs has no substitute.

    ReplyDelete
  7. Great piece of writeup.. highly informative...

    ReplyDelete

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