LHBfication, indeed! Good but can it be done in a jiffy?
LHB coaches are
inherently much safer than their ICF type counterparts. This fact is
established beyond debate, mainly due to the anti-climbing feature in the Tight-lock
couplers provided in them due to which coaches may scatter on the ground instead
of mounting over each other, stronger construct of the car body which prevents
tear and crumple and robust bogie and car body integrity. However, they come
with their own set of quirks that Indian Railways (IR) has been grappling with
for two decades. For example, jerks at the time of acceleration and braking and wheel shelling. Think of it like
trading a vintage car's charm for a sleek, modern ride that is just as likely
to give you whiplash when you are sound asleep.
In the cacophony
following the Kanchenjunga train mishap, one of the loudest questions has been
about the absence of LHB coaches in the express train's rake. Normally, I would
not touch this topic with a ten-foot pole because of a classic déjà vu; it has been written, and correctly so, more
times than a Bollywood star's secret wedding. But then I stumbled upon this gem
from India Today, which is either poorly researched or a masterclass in how not
to write an article:
To give IR credit
where it is due, IR has a plan in place to phase out ICF type coaches and
replace them with LHB coaches. But let us be real: this was not a Harry Potter
movie where you could just wave a magic wand and shout "LHBfication!"
and poof, 45000 ICF type coaches would vanish. The replacement pace has been
pretty good, but according to this article, ‘LHBfication’, a curious term as it
sounds like a transformation of the coach itself, is something you can achieve with a sprinkle
of pixie dust and an abracadabra.
Allow me to dissect
this trainwreck of an article for our dear readers, point by point, with my
comments in blue:
The
article kicks off with, ‘Kanchenjunga train mishap: Why it's time to ramp
up switch to LHB coaches’, and quotes the Comptroller and Auditor
General (CAG) who have been repeatedly warning the government about the dangers
of using Integral Coach Factory (ICF) rakes, urging them to replace all ICF
coaches with Linke-Hofmann-Busch (LHB) coaches to enhance passenger safety.
Fair enough
It
goes on to state that this accident has once again raised concerns about the
railway safety system. It mentions that the crash reportedly occurred at a
speed of around 80 km per hour, causing three coaches of the Kanchenjunga
Express to derail and two coaches to become mangled beyond recognition. The
crash allegedly happened because the automatic signalling system in the area
was not functional, leading to manual signalling procedures being followed.
Fine, but are we kidding here or what? The accident did not happen
simply because manual signalling procedures were in place. This is not an
uncommon practice. The root cause, prima facie, seems to be the disregard of
established procedures and protocols by the Loco Pilot and the Station Master.
Not to nitpick, but one would expect words and the sense in an article from a
reputed publication like India Today to be chosen with a bit more care.
The article states
that the Kanchenjunga Express comprised age-old and outdated ICF type coaches,
which have repeatedly proven to be significant safety hazards. It mentions that
the production of these ICF coaches was permanently halted in 2014.
Yes,
ICF type coaches are indeed less safe due to the damage they suffer in
collisions or high-speed derailments, leading to higher casualties. Calling
them a menace might be a bit harsh, considering they were the backbone of IR
passenger services from the 1950s until recently. Also, for the record, the
production of ICF coaches was stopped in 2017, not 2014. (Do I detect a
fixation on 2014 here? 😀)
The article also
points out that in November 2020, the CAG, in its audit report, stated that ICF
coaches have resulted in 98 percent more deaths compared to LHB coaches.
According to the CAG report, out of 20 train accidents (including derailments
and collisions) between 2014 and 2018, 17 involved ICF coaches and three
involved LHB coaches. In accidents with ICF coaches, 371 people died and 1,142
were injured, while in accidents involving LHB coaches, six people died and 115
sustained injuries.
I did
not verify these numbers, but they seem to be accurate.
In 2017, then Union
Railway Minister Piyush Goyal promised that all ICF type rakes would be
replaced by safer LHB rakes by 2022. However, in September 2020, the CAG once
again raised concerns about the continued use of ICF rakes, stating that with
the current rate of production, it would take another eight years to replace
all 903 ICF type rakes with LHB rolling stock. With the current rate of LHB
coach production (7,000 coaches manufactured in FY 2023-24), the complete
transition to LHB coaches seems like a distant dream.
I do
not recall these specific declarations by the former Minister of Railways.
Perhaps he was referring only to mail/express trains, considering the number of
ICF coaches far exceeds the 903 rakes (or approximately 20,000 coaches)
mentioned here. Moreover, not all newly produced LHB coaches can be used solely
for replacements; new services also require LHB coaches. We all know that
politicians can be overly ambitious, and reporters from reputable publications
should do their own research and provide well-founded opinions, which at times
is a matter of simply collating facts, figures and sound logic.
The
article then cites a Ministry of Railways report from January 2024, stating
that 50.5 percent of Indian Railways' passenger rolling stock is now LHB, while
49.5 percent remains ICF. It notes that approximately 35,450 ICF coaches still
need to be replaced and that a source in the IR claims that by the end of the
current financial year, the transition from all ICF rakes to LHB rolling stock
will be completed.
What a contradiction; by this time the article has already said
that the capacity of new manufacture of LHB coaches is 7000 per year, the
population of ICF type coaches is 35450 and yet it quotes a cryptic ‘source in the
IR’ that by 31st march 25, all ICF type coaches would be converted
to LHB type. Can you not do a simple math, my dear reporter?
The
article heaps praise on the LHB coach, highlighting their significant
advantages over ICF type coach. These advantages include anti-climbing features
to prevent coaches from mounting each other during a collision, crashworthiness
to absorb and dissipate energy during a collision to minimize impact forces on
passengers, fire-retardant materials, an emergency braking system, improved
suspension, energy-absorbing couplers, and advanced signalling and
communication systems to maintain safe distances between trains and improve
communication between the train crew and control centers.
There are some features which are directly related to safety and
listing them is fine. But since fire-retardant materials is mentioned, did they
check whether recent fire accidents involved LHB cases? As a matter of fact,
they did. It has a microprocessor-based brake system but to call it Emergency
Braking system and linking suspension system directly to safety instead of ride
quality hints at a copy paste job from an unreliable source. And the coup de
grâce is the bit about advanced signalling and communication systems, which
are typically features of locomotives and train sets, not individual LHB
coaches; since when did LHB coaches come with all these bells and whistles?
There are many
unnecessary repetitions and excessive details about certain accidents and train
compositions that I have chosen to ignore. However, the article does mention
the Balasore accident, asserting that the tragedy would have been much worse if
the two express trains had ICF coaches.
I am not so sure about this. The collision was so severe that
even LHB coaches toppled, got mangled and slid along the tracks. While we would
like to believe that LHB coaches would significantly mitigate such disasters,
it is technically challenging to make that claim with certainty.
Now my tuppence. The article could have made its point in half the space without
repetitions, misquotes, and mistakes. Nevertheless, I do believe that the
replacement of ICF type coaches with LHB or train sets needs to be further
prioritized. According to the production plans for 2024-25 and 2025-26, the
total number of LHB coaches planned for production is 5,688 and 4,840,
respectively. This is puzzlingly low when IR’s factories can easily produce
7,000, and with some push, 8,000 coaches per year. One reason for the low
production targets seems to be the overly ambitious plan to manufacture 1,012
and 1,600 train sets in 2024-25 and 2025-26. Given that the current production
achievement is merely around 500 coaches per year, this goal appears to be grossly
unrealistic.
I
suggest that the production of LHB coaches should be targeted at around 7,500
per year. With this level of production, ICF type coaches could be phased out
from all mainline trains within in approximately five years. This decision must
be made with the full understanding that a significant number of ICF coaches
will need to be retired prematurely. Considering the pros and cons, including
safety concerns, this approach is acceptable and clearly superior to the
previous decision of indiscriminate electrification, which rendered thousands
of operational diesel locomotives redundant. Additionally, there should be an
opportunity to increase the number of LHB AC coaches, which have been suddenly,
inexplicably and drastically reduced to accommodate more non-AC coaches
following criticism for the reduction of non-AC coaches in trains. Three years
back, the same IR had the then minister declaring that IR would henceforth
manufacture only AC coaches. IR should recognize that these new coaches will be
in service for a minimum of thirty years, and adding non-AC coaches in such
large numbers contradicts the vision of a developed India by 2047.
There
is enough capacity in IR’s factories, and now in the private sector too, to
manufacture train sets and AC LHB coaches in high numbers, without compromising
the needs of common travelers.
...
Good & Great Information sir
ReplyDeleteThe Jurno must have contacted some junior person in IR and got information on technical issues. Most of us will rely upon the article as we are not aware unless pointed out by an expert like you.
ReplyDeleteUnfortunately, knowledgeable investigative reporters, especially on issues related to the railways, do not exist in India. All the info is based on hearsay material or the one that PRO has handed over to them during Chai-Samosa session.
ReplyDeleteGood information but what the Government thinks about this issue?
ReplyDeleteCommendable response from person like you who knows ins & out of ICF and coaches.
ReplyDeleteInstead of investigating what led to the accident (and the earlier ones) in the first place, namely, disregard of standard operating procedures by staff, the article diverts the attention to a less significant problem, namely LHB coaches. These coaches may provide greater safety in case of collisions but the kind of collisions this accident as well as the Balasore accident involved would almost certainly have led to large number of casualties any way. Kavach coould provide some greater safety, surely, but there are limits to these technological solutions. Still the skills and the willingness to go by SoPs has no substitute.
ReplyDeleteGreat piece of writeup.. highly informative...
ReplyDelete