Veer Biharis! And why this border clash is different

  

India and China, the two nuclear powers, have come head to head in recent days. It has generated a flood of discourses and emotions at a scale not seen in recent years, not even when the two had squared off at Doklam and remained deadlocked for 72 days. Let us go back to June 2017 near the trijunction point of border between China, Bhutan and India. Bhutan declared that the Doklam territory on which China was building a road was a Bhutanese territory although it was being claimed by China and it was a part of the ongoing border negotiations. India, which is committed to looking after the defence of Bhutan through a treaty, sent troops to the construction site and challenged the road work being done by China. After some face off, negotiations were held, India pulled back its troops and China stopped the construction at least in the immediate part of the disputed territory. Bhutan maintained that it did not want India and China to go to war and generally avoided doing anything that would aggravate an already heated situation.  

Do you remember 1967? Yes, 1967. Many Indians really do not know about 1967 and remember only the humiliation of 1962. Briefly, The Nathu La and Cho La clashes, which should actually be known as the second Indo-China War, were a series of armed clashed between the two militaries alongside the border of Sikkim, then a protectorate of India. At Nathu La, clashes began on 11 September 1967 with PLA attacked Indian posts and the battle continued for four days. This was followed by another one day battle in October 1967 at Cho la. India defeated China in these battles, while driving back the invading Chinese army and even gained some tactical advantage by destroying the PLA fortifications. These battles were started by China to claim strategic positions in disputed territory by force but were repelled by the combat performance of Indian army. The clashes were confined to the region and the world noticed that India performed well both militarily and diplomatically. It did not engage in a war of words but remained firm with restraint. I narrate this only as prelude to the tension that has always been there between India and China but unlike our daily problems with Pakistan, things have been resolved without any major skirmish and causalities since 1967. Since then, China has been trying similar intruding tactics off and on but it has never resulted in any major face off. The last bullet fired along the Chinese frontier was in the Arunachal Pradesh sector in October 1975, when patrols of the two sides came face-to-face amid dense fog at Tuhung La and an Indian soldier was killed. 

Friends, Pakistan is non-trustworthy and stupid. I speak with full responsibility that you can always trust them to cut their nose to spite their face. China, on the other hand, is not only equally non-trustworthy and treacherous but more than that, extremely wily. Because they are not stupid and because they do consider India a major competitor, they keep engaging in pin pricks but avoid major confrontations. The recent Chinese intrusions and border skirmishes, including those with proxy states like Pakistan and Nepal, should be seen in the context of China facing global heat in a post-Covid world. It is losing reputation as industries talk of moving out. India should consider these changes in circumstances while responding.  

Chinese are actually back to their old tricks since late April of this year. Three serious face off points have arisen due to their actions in eastern Ladakh at Pangong Tso, Gogra Hot Springs and Galwan river and now even at Depsang. While we talked of perceptions about LAC, calling it an imaginary line, trying to downplay the issue, the Chinese has seized the initiative by securing large tracts of if not Indian, at least, the gray areas or disputed territories with deployment of troops, shelters, pill boxes, even artillery & ammunition and other military wherewithal. The plan seems to be not only practice and exercise to calibrate their weaponry for high altitude and test their electronic warfare equipment like powerful jammers to control the electro-magnetic spectrum and communications but also a clear design that once the negotiations start, as they naturally would, China would be sitting pretty in a position of strength. Their positions would be more like permanent defences with great attack and monitoring capabilities from dominating heights overlooking the Leh to DB Oldie road built by India along the LAC. They would venture to impose unacceptable conditions on India like no further development of infrastructure on the Indian side as a wily means to restore a debatable status quo; in any case, their recent deployments and training have brought them to a position from which they can exercise great military coercion on India along the LAC. We have to see the Galwan skirmish in this background; it is reactionary on part of India, showing that we were indeed unprepared. Unlike past conflicts, the stand-off this time is at more than one location, including the Galwan Valley, with the Finger areas of the Pangong Tso the most troublesome as they have this infrastructure in place between Finger 4 to 8. Also the Nathu La pass in Sikkim. We cannot disassociate what happened between India and Nepal at Lipu Lekh in this context. De-inducting soldiers from these remote areas would require careful strategising.  

So how should India respond to China’s aggression with economic, democratic and military solutions? India of today must act with the confidence of a proud nation that is clear about its sovereignty, democratic advantage and will to achieve its dreams without denying anyone theirs. Our soldiers have done their duty and now our international image and long-term security depends on our political, diplomatic and military response. China only understands strength. India, through its actions that extend beyond the military realm, must show that China seriously miscalculated in starting a border conflict with it.  

What has been happening so far? The MEA spokesperson tells us one day that the Chinese are on their side of the LAC and we are on ours, and all is hunky dory. The next day we are told the two had agreed to disengaging. Similarily, we were informed after the bloody fracas at Galwan on the 15th night that all Indian soldiers were accounted for; the next day we learn that we had managed to secure the release of ten Indian soldiers captured by the PLA although unconfirmed reports suggest we returned certain captured Chinese soldiers including their CO. We are told that our soldiers were armed but protocols prevented them from using the weapons when they were being killed. And the supremely cryptic, “na ghus aaye hain aur na ghuse hue hain” by the PM himself. It may be technically correct as the Chinese deployment is perhaps mostly in the gray areas but are we looking for mere technicalities here? 

Are we not hearing frequently today that the LAC was a concept, perception or that LAC was an idea? Really? So how does a perception run through mountains and valleys? Both the sides agreed with certain norms of mutual and equal security but that too is only a concept! The LAC became legally tenable through the agreement signed in 1993 and later, stipulating that either side should not overstep the line of actual control, given that the two sides agreed that references to the LAC did not prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question. If you do not have a clearly-defined border, or the Line of Actual Control, you are leaving it easy for the shifty and shrewd Chinese to keep moving it whenever they build their power next to the so called perception. Remember, there is also a self-defeating discourse in India that incursions keep taking place by both sides but as I understand it is done mainly by China as they have a defined goal to incorporate the five fingers of Tibet whereas we are always in the defensive.  

China has always perceived India as a rival in the new world order post world war and never let an opportunity pass to keep it suppressed. Its continued indulgence with Pakistan is primarily based in its desire to keep India contained. The peace on the LAC notwithstanding, it has always needled India with major initiatives like CPEC running through POK and Hambantota port in our backwaters in Sri Lanka. Now, it has managed to befriend even Nepal. What has prompted the Chinese to step their efforts in recent times? A concurrence of many reasons. Change in the status of Ladakh region by India, a region the Chinese may tomorrow say that they would like to talk about with the Pakistanis, not Indians. Recent scaling up of infrastructure on India’s side of the LAC in recent years. A definite convergence in the geo-political thinking of the US and India and a clear indication that India was aligning to frame an Indo-Pacific strategy. India trying to meddle with the Hong Kong debate. And India too pushing for post-Covid economic world order to exclude China or at least reduce its influence. 

Galwan valley face-off is an opportunity for India to show to China that that this time it had overdone its machinations. They are certainly shocked by the way India hit back tactically at Galwan valley. Determined resistance has to follow. Misplaced  complacence has cost us dear for decades but there is no point in a political post mortem of actions by this and that government. They have moved more than 10000 soldiers in the eastern sector and we have now followed up with as many; while their personnel are acclimatized already, our soldiers have to be trained for the terrain. The Modi government must show that it would not be tricked into any compromise in our defences because of China’s false words of peace and tranquillity. We must aim for peace but from a position of strength which, even if it is not very robust today, must be built up gradually.  

A question would come up whether India could really think of and venture into such a strategic outreach as standing with the US as a part of the Indo-Pacific pillar in South China Sea even as we were unable to secure our own frontiers. India’s task is, therefore, cut out. We have to first ensure that status quo ante of early April, 2020 is agreed to thereby sanctifying the prevailing practice and give a firmer perception to this idea of LAC. Only such an outcome may, and I say may and not will, prevent China from making a moving claim beyond the LAC in future to gain tactical advantage and cause embarrassment to India. 

There is one more aspect which we should always remember. With both Pakistan and China, you are not dealing with countries with an honourable record. These are countries which do not even honour their martyrs, unlike us, one for the fear of letting the world know that the intruders sent by it were actually army regulars and the other for fear of accepting to its people and the world that it got the worst of an exchange at the border. Can you imagine India ever dishonouring its brave by simply burying or cremating them stealthily, as these countries do? 

Talks at Corps Commander level are on. What we are getting are mixed signals but as these talks proceed, we should hold our peace. Particularly the politicians, and yes, the opposition netas. The talks may be upgraded to higher military and diplomatic level. Let us hope for a favourable outcome. But please make no mistake, we have to treat the Galwan incident as an opportunity. We have to be firmer than ever. It is always incorrect to talk of even a limited battle but the option to use force, if we do not get an acceptable response from China, has to be kept alive, as this may well be the now or never moment. 

Let us briefly talk about the clashes of 15^th June as it is a story of fierce bravery by the jawans of Bihar regiment. An agreement was reached on 6^th June between the local commanders that both the sides would back off from the forward positions near the LAC. The CO, Colonel Babu and a few men went to the Patrol point 14 to remove the tents in which the Chinese had earlier dug in. The Chinese apparently waited for an unprovoked fight, armed with batons wrapped with barbed wire, nail-studded clubs and similar medieval instruments. They attacked and injured the CO Babu and his men. The major of the unit learnt of the unexpected assault on the CO and the men and arrived on the scene soon after with additional troops. It increased the number of Indian soldiers to some extent but they were still outnumbered by an overwhelming margin. They, however, also took on the Chinese viciously, not caring for the still very adverse odds. 

We lost twenty men in the hand to hand combat, including the CO. But our brave soldiers managed to give a fierce response. The number of causalities was not declared by the Chinese, as it is always their policy but it is slowly becoming clear that they got a bloody nose, they certainly ate more than they could chew. The country must take courage from the immediate and spirited response from the soldiers on the ground. They admirably helped cement our belief in the courage and derring-do of the Indian armed forces. 

Some words about the institution of the Commanding Officer, his paltan and the izzat of the regiment in the Indian army. To a combat soldier, the ultimate father figure, the inspirer is the CO, not the general or the Brigade Commander who are too distant. I will not go into the motivation of the British to create regiments based on the concept of martial races but talk of the ethos that permeates it today. In the regionalism of the Indian Army, a cocky young man from Telangana embraces the traditions of Purbaiya warriors as a Bihari and one day, goes down fighting alongside his fierce warriors in the spirit of the brigade’s fighters and folk heroes. 

A CO is an institution within an institution and irrespective of the position one may achieve as an army officer, the prestige and honour of commanding a battalion is perhaps unequalled by all other service experiences. The ecosystem of a battalion, or in its expansive form, a regiment, is vested in the honourable gallantry which has two elements; on one hand, the uniform, the flag, the insignia, the beret and also the war cries but on the other hand in a person to look up to, Commanding Officer, the epitome of the regimental valour and values. The soldiers of Indian army are otherwise simple men who are beyond the influences of the divides and the bigotry in the civilian domain. These uncomplicated men seek and feel proud in the singular identity of his paltan with the Commanding Officer being his conscience keeper. An Indian soldier would willingly unleash incredible fervor in attack, without a care about his own life on the command of a CO not because of the latter’s rank but because what he and his words represent. 

On 15^th June, these bravehearts, not merely from Bihar and Jharkhand, but from Orissa, UP, Punjab, Haryana and Tamil Nadu did in the treacherous Galwan valley what very few of us would ever have the privilege or the courage to do. They walked the talk of Indian Army’s motto, ‘Service before Self’. I recommend the readers to go through this excellent article by Lt. Gen. P.R.Shankar, Retd., https://www.gunnersshot.com/2020/06/the-armed-forces-of-india-unyeilding.html 

The supreme act of valour shown by the CO, Col. Santosh Babu, and his men originates certainly from their individual bravery but the traditions of the Indian army form the  wellspring which help these men fight and die like valiant heroes. It is the collective actions of our armymen that ensure the sovereignty of India, not because of what the Government does for them, but despite it. As I said earlier, it is now for the political leadership to show the courage in dealing with China, a government response which matches the trenchant courage and gallantry of the Bihar Regiment's soldiers in service to the motherland.  

Join me, friends, in saluting these brave souls and let us be ever grateful that we have an army which would be there for us, every time, always.  

Theirs not to question why, theirs but to do and die.

With a difference. With victory at their feet.

Jai Hind

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