More Zones, Less Railway: Why Fragmentation Is No Substitute for Reform
On June 1, Indian
Railways (IR) proudly added an 18th star to its official emblem to celebrate
the birth of yet another railway zone, South Coast Railway at Visakhapatnam. At
this rate, the logo may soon require a constellation chart rather than a
graphic designer. One almost expected fireworks, commemorative stamps, and
perhaps even a proclamation that the laws of railway economics had finally been
repealed. Unfortunately, the new star signifies not operational progress but
the continuing fragmentation of a national transporter into ever-smaller
territorial fiefdoms. What is presented as decentralisation is, in reality, the
steady Balkanisation of IR, driven less by operational necessity than by
political considerations.
I wrote
about it in The Hindu BusinessLine on 2 June 2026 (link and image appened in
the end) and here is a summary of that:
IR
was never meant to function like a collection of state fiefdoms. It was
designed as a seamless national network moving passengers and freight across
vast distances with operational unity, economies of scale, and coordinated
logistics. For decades, a compact zonal structure served that purpose
effectively. But from the late 1990s onward, operational logic gave way to
political compulsions. New zones mushroomed, each demanding fresh headquarters,
bureaucracies, control offices, vehicles, and ceremonial hierarchies. Zonal
headquarters became political trophies.
The
argument that smaller zones improve efficiency is misplaced. The real
operational backbone of IR lies in its divisions, which already handle train
operations, safety, traffic control, manpower, and emergencies. In an age of
real-time monitoring and digital communications, multiplying intermediate
headquarters adds more red tape than efficiency. More zones do not create
additional track capacity, improve punctuality, enhance safety, or increase
freight earnings. They merely create more boundaries, inter-zonal disputes,
delays, and additional establishment costs.
The
deeper damage is institutional. As zones increasingly mirror political
boundaries, regionalism begins replacing the all-India character that once
defined the railways. Managers who once mastered cross-country logistics risk
becoming custodians of local sentiment.
If
better monitoring is the objective, divisions should be empowered with
resources, accountability, and autonomy. IR needs consolidation, not endless
fragmentation. Otherwise, the network risks dying not from one great failure,
but from a thousand administrative cuts.
A caveat first. More
zones undoubtedly create more senior positions. The zonal expansion of the late
1990s accelerated promotions for many railway officers, perhaps including my
own advancement, which might otherwise have remained uncertain. Yet executive
promotions cannot be the benchmark for national policy. Anecdotally, if one
were to poll senior railway managers, a large majority would agree that
excessive zonal fragmentation has harmed rather than strengthened the organisation.
Unfortunately, professional opinion has seldom counted for much in such
decisions on railways. Added to this is a system that can, at times, reward
acquiescence more readily than independent professional judgment.
I will merely elaborate
some points which could not be presented in detail in the article due to the
constraint of newspaper space:
1. IR is a National Transporter, not a Federation of Zones: IR is
unique. It is not merely a public enterprise but an arm of the Central
Government whose primary purpose is to provide seamless transportation across our
vast country, its very raison d'être. One may legitimately argue that
transportation should eventually be handled by a corporatised entity with
greater private-sector participation. Manufacturing, premium train services,
dedicated freight operations, and commercial development of station assets are
all natural candidates for such reforms. Yet successive governments have shown
little appetite for meaningful restructuring. Ironically, a corporatised
railway would probably be far less vulnerable to political fragmentation. Instead,
while genuine reform remains stalled, the politically attractive alternative of
carving the system into state-oriented zones continues unabated. The result is
a gradual erosion of the all-India character that has historically been one of
IR’s greatest strengths.
2. The Wrong Unit of Decentralisation: It’s
the Division, Friend, Not the Zone: Supporters of smaller
zones argue that reduced geographical span allows closer monitoring, quicker
response to failures, and greater sensitivity to local needs. There is merit in
that argument, but it identifies the wrong organisational unit. The operational
backbone of IR is not the zone but the division. Divisions are the cutting edge
in the field. They run trains, maintain safety, manage manpower, control
traffic, and respond to failures and emergencies. Zonal headquarters perform an
intermediate coordinating function between the divisions and the Railway Board.
In an age of real-time monitoring, advanced analytics, and digital
communications, the need for multiplying intermediate headquarters has
diminished considerably.
Proponents also argue that a zonal headquarters acts as an economic
catalyst for its host state, ensuring that regional transport demands,
passenger amenities, and industrial linkages receive immediate attention to
correct historical imbalances. An empowered Division is better placed to appreciate,
address, and escalate to the right authorities the local transportation requirements
and concerns.
Furthermore,
creating more zones does not magically generate more track capacity, higher
safety standards, better punctuality, or increased freight earnings. It simply
creates more boundaries impinging on mobility and adds another layer of bureaucracy
in management, with a bloated administrative cost. A rail network's capability
to move millions of humans and tonnes of freight is entirely independent of the
number of zones it operates. In fact, fewer zones facilitate better
coordination.
When
zones are sliced out of existing geographies without any real increase in the
network's overall physical size, the system succumbs to severe diseconomies of
scale. Freight traffic, the financial lifeline of IR, demands seamless,
long-distance, uninterrupted movement. Carving up the map creates artificial
interchange points, multiplying inter-zonal coordination disputes, administrative
impediments, and operational roadblocks based on narrow zonal considerations.
Creation of more zones
leads to more ‘inspecting’, rather than ‘executing’, officers and a phalanx of
secretariat staff, offices, and vehicles; field officers therefore spend
considerable time on largely infructuous inspections, endless presentations, and
protocol duties. As it is, railways suffer from the Board and Zonal officers increasingly
engaged in acting as ‘super’ executives, resolving petty territorial
coordination disputes instead of looking at long-term policy, technological
upgrades, and the strategic future of national logistics.
So,
clearly, if we need smaller units for better monitoring of failures and
operations, the solution is to have empowered Divisions and not multiplicity of
Zones. Empowering divisions does not mean a superficial offloading of financial
or manpower powers; it means providing them with well-defined, customised, and
achievable targets alongside the time-bound wherewithal to meet them. The time
has come to halt the expansion and reverse the tide of meaningless Balkanisation.
Although reversion to the original structure of nine zones is impossible at
this stage, we need to rationally consolidate the existing zones, strip away
redundant intermediate babudom, empower the divisional field units, and
restore IR to what it was always meant to be: a unified, highly efficient,
pan-India economic engine.
3. Unhealthy Regionalism
Perhaps
the most insidious fallout of this trend is the rise of regionalism within a
historically proud, well-integrated national cadre. As zones shrink to fit
political boundaries, they become highly vulnerable to regional and state-level
political pressures. An organisation that once prided itself on an all-India
character is slowly being converted into a collection of regional entities
competing for local supremacy rather than national efficiency. Managers and
engineers, once masters of cross-country logistics, are forced to become
custodians of regional sentiments. As a seasoned rail veteran recently
observed, critical size is crucial; big is bad, but small is not necessarily
beautiful because it creates too many roadblocks, drives up establishment costs,
and violates the spirit of the ease of doing business. The historical fabric of
the railways—where cross-cultural operations were the norm, such as Telugu
schools and Telugu MLAs thriving in Kharagpur, West Bengal—is fast becoming a
memory.
4. Where will it Stop?
This scramble for
smaller zones can be even more detrimental. Today, the only major
states left without a dedicated zonal headquarters are Gujarat and Kerala.
Given the current political climate, it is likely only a matter of time before
localized demands in these states gain momentum, forcing further fragmentation.
Then you have states like Punjab, Haryana and Jharkhand, which are smaller but
no less politically significant. How would the flawed logic of ‘better
administrative efficiency in smaller zones and greater interface with a state’s
aspirations’ be denied in their case when a demand may soon arise for their own
zonal HQs?
Time will tell if we will have further fragmentation in the shape of West Coast Railway (Gujarat) and Southern Most Railway (Kerala) or IR’s efficiency and profitability will take precedence over this red herring of reorganisation into more and more zones.
…
Railways Splintered Into Too Many Zones
https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/railways-splintered-into-too-many-zones/article71049539.ece
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