Snubbing Its Own: The Puzzling Case of ICF and High-Speed Trains

 

 

The news doing the rounds is that Indian Railways (IR) is poised to award a massive contract to M/s Bharat Earthmovers Limited (BEML) for sixteen more high-speed trainsets, coming close on the heels of a contract already awarded to them for developing two prototype 8-coach indigenous high-speed trainsets for ₹866.87 crore for the Standard Gauge Mumbai–Ahmedabad corridor under construction. I had firmly believed that the Integral Coach Factory (ICF), Chennai, ought to have been the natural choice for designing and manufacturing these prototypes, in preference to BEML. That decision was, however, taken in favour of BEML, but one expected that at least this time the mandate would revert to ICF. I said as much, and those views have found place across several media platforms including The Print, ETV Bharat, MSN, among others (referenced at the end).

 

I am fully aware that while many may agree, there will be others who would argue that the quality of BEML’s products surpasses that of ICF, and that my position is coloured by my association with ICF, where I led the Train 18/Vande Bharat team eight years ago. Some may even choose to troll. That, of course, is part of the game. Yet, it is precisely to pre-empt such arguments that I find it necessary to lay out, more fully and clearly, the reasons behind my stand.

 

It may well be argued that my view is guided by affection for ICF. It is equally possible that there exists a sound rationale for favouring BEML alone, though such reasoning is not available in the public domain. Be that as it may, let me set out my position plainly.

 

The indigenous development of a high-speed train is unquestionably a welcome step. I have consistently advocated this approach, maintaining that while 350/320 kmph trains from Japan must be deployed to fully utilise the infrastructure being built, we must simultaneously nurture indigenous design of trains capable of operating in the 220–250 kmph range during slack periods as part of our own experimentation and learning curve. In the end, this has happened, but less as a result of a coherent strategic vision and more as a cynical consequence of failed negotiations with the Japanese, whose pricing proved astronomical. One would have applauded the decision far more had it emerged as a natural progression of the Vande Bharat initiative rather than as a reluctant fallback. Even so, it remains a step in the right direction.

 

When it comes to mainline coach design and manufacture, ICF remains the finest asset India possesses. Yes, its quality standards require improvement, and it’s still far away from being ‘world-class’, but judged on proven capability and accumulated experience, no other unit within Indian Railways (whether RCF or MCF), nor any PSU or private player, matches it. That a unit which ushered in the Vande Bharat revolution and was rightly celebrated for it should now be treated almost as an afterthought, while preference is extended to an entity that has never designed a mainline passenger coach, is nothing short of baffling. Even the recently rolled-out Vande Sleeper from BEML involved limited original design input, with much of the design having been handed over from ICF’s Vande Bharat repertoire. Despite this, the project saw significant delays: the first rake, though built and tested, remains unused, and only the modified second and third rakes have been inducted into service.

 

The recent mandate assigning ICF the task of building two 16-coach trainsets designed for 220/200 kmph operation on existing broad-gauge tracks appears, frankly, to be a red herring. The rationale is difficult to comprehend. Even the 180/160 kmph Vande Bharat services operate well below potential, typically in the 110–130 kmph range, due to the absence of 160 kmph-capable broad-gauge tracks. Where, then, is a 220 kmph train expected to run? Even if one assumes that such a train would be tested at up to 200 kmph on the new test track being built in Rajasthan, it would remain precisely that: a test specimen, not a commercially deployed asset. What motivation can any engineering team derive from building a product that is not going to see real-world service? It begins to look less like a meaningful assignment and more like a token gesture: crumbs to keep ICF nominally engaged.

 

Are we committed to building a robust, competitive ecosystem for high-speed rail manufacturing, or are we inexplicably placing disproportionate faith in a single, relatively inexperienced player? The current trajectory suggests the latter, at the expense of broader participation, which is essential for innovation, resilience, and long-term capability building. While ICF is the natural front-runner, there are also competent designers and manufacturers in the private sector who deserve encouragement and inclusion.

 

Equally troubling is the apparent insistence on stainless steel (SS) coach construction for high-speed trains. The global shift away from SS happened long ago; aluminium has become the material of choice due to its lighter weight, superior energy efficiency, and better aesthetics. Even if SS were to be accepted as a starting point for prototypes, committing to it for large-scale production, presumably for the entire fleet, effectively shuts the door on aluminium-based designs, thereby locking us into a sub-optimal technological path.

 

Let me be clear: I am not blind to BEML’s strengths. In fact, I was the one who supported its re-entry into the mainline passenger coach domain in 2017, after decades of inaction, and placed an order on them as GM/ICF for a complete rake of LHB coach shells. I remain open to being persuaded if a compelling, transparent, and technically sound argument in favour of BEML is presented. But as matters stand today, the optics and the substance suggest a troubling pattern: a stepmotherly treatment meted out to a proven in-house institution, in favour of a less experienced entity.

 

Whether this is due to ICF’s own abdication or an inexplicable sidelining by the Ministry, the outcome is the same. Excluding ICF from Standard Gauge high-speed coach manufacturing would not merely be an institutional slight; it would be a strategic blunder, a self-inflicted wound. IR’s high-speed train manufacturing capability can only be built through a stepped learning curve; sidelining one’s own proven institution in that journey is nothing short of a self-goal.

 

And in the end, unless my views are convincingly corrected, one is reminded of King Lear’s bitter truth on ingratitude: “How sharper than a serpent’s tooth it is to have a thankless child!” and of Julius Caesar’s enduring verdict: “This was the most unkindest cut of all.”

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Ref.

The Print 29^th April 26: https://theprint.in/india/with-a-proven-track-record-icf-should-be-first-choice-for-high-speed-trains-vande-bharat-maker/2917735/

 

https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil-nadu/2026/Apr/20/chennai-icf-tasked-with-building-two-220-kmph-train-sets

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